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Judge Posner and the NLRB: Implications
for Labor Law Reform
Leonard Bierman*
Judge Richard A. Posner is a vocal and forceful critic of
the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or 'Board") and
the labor policy he believes the NLRB pursues. He has sharply
criticized the Board on a variety of counts ranging from proce-
dure to policy and, in some instances, has explicitly refused to
defer to the Board's administrative expertise.' This Article ex-
amines Judge Posner's general view of the National Labor Re-
lations Act ('"NLRA" or "Act")2 and his recent criticisms of the
NLRB in the context of NLRA reform. Part I presents an
overview of Judge Posner's view of the NLRA and the powers
it grants the NLRB. Part II examines several of Judge Pos-
ner's recent decisions criticizing the NLRB, and Part III ana-
lyzes the public-policy implications of those decisions and the
ramifications for congressional labor law reform. Finally, Part
IV questions the need for such reform and urges that any re-
form of the NLRB's structure or powers should be accom-
plished by Congress after deliberate consideration of all factors
rather than initiated by federal judges on an ad hoc basis.
I. JUDGE POSNER'S VIEW OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
Judge Posner views labor unions as "worker cartels
designed to raise the price of labor above the competitive
level."3 As originally enacted in 1935, the NLRA 4 created "a
* Assistant Professor of Management, Texas A&M Business SchooL
1. See, eg., NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983); NLRB
v. American Medical Servs., Inc., 705 F.2d 1472 (7th Cir. 1983); Mosey Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, 701 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1983).
2. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
3. See Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CfI. L. REv. 988, 991
(1984); see also R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 239 (2d ed. 1977)
('The primary purpose of a union is to control the supply of labor so that the
employer cannot use competition among individual laborers to keep down the
price of labor."). Judge Posner therefore believes that unions use the strike to
create and enforce what is essentially a monopolistic power over labor serv-
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system of federal regulation administered by a new agency, the
National Labor Relations Board, [that was] designed ... to fos-
ter unionization." 5 The establishment of the NLRB is, in Judge
Posner's opinion, further evidence that "the National Labor
Relations Act is best understood as a means of federal govern-
mental support for the cartelization of the labor supply." As
Judge Posner explained:
Since the Act turned labor policy on its head, transforming a public
policy of fostering competitive determination of wages and working
conditions into one of fostering cartelization, it was quite sensible for
Congress to be concerned that state and federal judges-who after all
had largely fashioned the former policy-might resist its inversion.
7
Judge Posner asserts that the NLRB has a definite pro-
union bias, and he questions the appropriateness of that bias
under the current NLRA. Noting that the NLRA, as originally
enacted in 1935, was clearly prounion,8 Judge Posner explains
ices. See id at 240; Posner, supra, at 990, 997-98, 1001-02. When Judge Posner
describes unions as cartels, he is, of course, speaking only as an economist:
Lest this seem an impolitic (especially for a judge) condemnation of
the union movement, I emphasize that I am using the word "carteliza-
tion" in a nonpejorative, technical sense .... I take no position on
whether it is socially preferable for the price of labor to be deter-
mined on a competitive or on a cartelized basis. My analysis is posi-
tive, not normative.
Posner, supra, at 990.
4. Wagner Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)). The NLRA consists of the Wagner Act of 1935, as
amended, principally, by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.
5. Posner, supra note 3, at 992 (footnote omitted). Judge Posner notes
that the NLRA, by legalizing nonviolent strikes and protecting workers from
employer retaliation, has shifted many of the risks and economic costs of
strikes from workers to employers, thereby strengthening the role of unions
and raising the cost of labor. See id at 997-98. A strike imposes costs on both
parties: the employer may be forced to reduce or halt production and workers
lose their wages. According to Judge Posner, the balance of these costs will
determine the parties' relative bargaining power and thus the terms of the set-
tlement ultimately reached. See id at 997. The NLRA affects these costs. For
example, the employer is not allowed to pay replacement workers more than
the striking workers were receiving, nor may the employer fire workers who
have been replaced. These rules limit the employer's ability to minimize its
costs and therefore shift the balance in favor of the workers. See id. at 997-98.
Similarly, the NLRA fosters the cartelization of labor markets by prevent-
ing employers from engaging in what Posner terms "rational predatory activ-
ity" to defeat unionization in its incipient organizational stages, see id. at 1003-
04, and by allowing union-shop agreements whereby all workers at a unionized
location can be required to pay dues and fees, see R. POSNER, supra note 3, at
241-42; Posner, supra note 3, at 994-95.
6. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1009.
7. Id
8. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)) (declaring that it is the policy of the United
[Vol. 69:881
LABOR LAW REFORM
that with the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments,9 Congress par-
tially redressed the NLRA's heavy tilt toward unions'0 so that
the Act "no longer evinces a univocal policy of promoting carte-
lization.""- Nevertheless, it is clear from some of Judge Pos-
ner's recent opinions that he believes that the NLRB has not
fully comprehended the "message" of the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments. Indeed, he has referred explicitly to the sharp prounion
bias of the Board,' 2 and he has not hesitated to ignore the
Board's administrative expertise and substitute his own views
of the NLRA for those of the NLRB.13
Today, according to Judge Posner, "there are very few
judges, state or federal, who have any emotional or intellectual
commitment to competitive labor markets."'14 Judge Posner's
States to encourage "the practice and procedure of collective bargaining");
Posner, supra note 3, at 992, 1010. See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R.
GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 72-76 (9th ed. 1981) (describ-
ing the philosophy of the Wagner Act).
9. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No.
80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982)).
10. See Posner, supra note 3, at 992. See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R.
GORMAN, supra note 8, at 81-87 (describing the philosophy of the Taft-Hartley
Act); STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 548-53 (R. Koretz ed. 1970)
(same).
11. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1010.
12. See East Chicago Rehabilitation Center v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 397, 402
(7th Cir. 1983) (referring to "the Board's all too frequent bias toward unions"),
cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1414 (1984).
13. See cases cited supra note 1. Judge Posner has challenged the idea
that an administrative agency's statutory interpretations are entitled to
deference:
Another canon [of statutory construction] that rests on an unreal-
istic view of the political process is the canon that the interpretation
of a statute by the administrative agency that enforces it is entitled to
great weight by the courts. There is no reason to expect administra-
tive agency members, appointed and confirmed long after the enact-
ment of the legislation they are enforcing, to display a special fidelity
to the original intent of the legislation rather than to the current poli-
cies of the Administration and the Congress. They may of course
know more than the courts about the legislation, and to the extent
they support their interpretation with reasons at least plausibly based
on superior knowledge the courts should give that interpretation
weight. But the mere fact that it is the current agency interpretation
does not entitle it to any particular weight. If the interpretation has
persisted through several changes of Administration, that may be a
different matter.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. Cm. L. REv. 800, 810-11 (1983) (footnote omitted).
14. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1009. Judge Posner continued- "I am sure
that most judges today would agree that if federal labor policy is one of facili-
tating the cartelization of labor, they should, and without much pain can, use
this policy to guide them in reviewing decisions of the NLRB." Id at 1010.
1985]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
statement implies that, if the only purpose of the NLRB is to
prevent the evisceration of the NLRA by a hostile judiciary, the
Board has outlived its usefulness. Similarly, Judge Posner's ac-
tions as a federal judge indicate that he is willing to override
the Board's decisions whenever necessary to enforce the spirit
of neutrality expressed in the Taft-Hartley amendments. An
examination of five labor opinions written by Judge Posner
since his appointment to the bench in 1981 illustrates his
approach.
II. JUDGE POSNER'S LABOR-LAW THEORIES
IN ACTION
A. PUTTING EMPLOYERS "THROUGH THE Hoops": MOSEY
MANUFACTURING Co. v. NLRB
Judge Posner's use of the review process to counter
antiemployer bias in NLRB decisions is well exemplified by his
opinion in Mosey Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB. 15 Writing for a
majority of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en
banc, Judge Posner overturned the Board's decision 16 and
sharply criticized the Board for unfairly putting the employer
"through the hoops.' 17
Judge Posner's complaint was with the NLRB's frequent
reversals of position on important policy issues.' 8 The issue in
Mosey was whether a union misrepresentation made on the eve
of an election was sufficient to invalidate election results. Just
two months before the Mosey election, in Shopping Kart Food
Market, Inc.,19 the Board had held that it would no longer try
15. 701 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
16. See id. at 615.
17. See id. at 612.
18. These shifts of policy are a recurrent problem and usually occur when
the political composition of the Board changes. See generally Dunau, The Role
of Criticism in the Work of the National Labor Relations Board, 16 N.Y.U.
CoNF. LAB. 205 (1963) (responding to criticism of the Board's disregard of stare
decisis); Hickey, Stare Decisis and the NLRB, 17 LAB. L.J. 451, 460-62 (1966)
(defending the use of appointments to change the Board's philosophy). A re-
cent example is the Reagan-appointed NLRB's overruling of decisions made by
the Carter-appointed NLRB. See, e.g., Milwaukee Spring Div., 268 N.L.R.B.
No. 87 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1065 (Jan. 23, 1984), rev'g 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982);
Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 86 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1056 (Jan. 19, 1984), over-
ruling Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980), and Propoco,
Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982); Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (Dec. 20,
1983), overruling T.R.W. Bearings Div., 257 N.L.R.B. 442 (1981) (holding that
rules prohibiting employees from soliciting during "working time" or "work-
ing hours" are presumptively invalid).
19. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
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to protect workers from misleading campaign statements as it
had under the rule of Hollywood Ceramics Co. ;20 under the new
rule, an election would be set aside only if the misrepresenta-
tion involved the use of a forged document.2 The following
year, the NLRB, by then dominated by Carter appointees, re-
versed Shopping Kart in General Knit of California, Inc.22 and
reinstated the rule of Hollywood Ceramics.23 Then, in 1982, a
Reagan-appointed NLRB decided Midland National Life Insur-
ance Co.,2 which again asserted the Shopping Kart standard.2
In Mosey, the union's one-vote election victory was chal-
lenged on the basis of alleged union misrepresentations of fact
made during the campaign.26 Employing the then-applicable
Shopping Kart standard, the NLRB denied the company's chal-
lenge and ordered the company to bargain with the union.2
The Board applied to the Seventh Circuit to enforce its order
but, before oral argument, the NLRB decided General Knit,
which overruled Shopping Kart without indicating which stan-
dard should be applied to pending cases.28 The Seventh Circuit
remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration in light of
the new General Knit standard.2 On remand, the NLRB de-
termined that there had been no material misrepresentation,
reinstated its bargaining order against Mosey, and reapplied to
the court for enforcement.3 0 After oral argument but before
the panel reported its decision, the NLRB in Midland National
20. 140 N.LR.B. 221 (1962). Under the Hollywood Ceramics rule, an elec-
tion will be set aside "where there has been a misrepresentation ... which
involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time which prevents the
other party... from making an effective reply, so that the misrepresentation,
whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be expected to have a significant
impact on the election." See id. at 224 (footnote omitted).
21. Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1313-14 (1977).
The Board maintained that as long as campaign material is what it purports to
be, employees need no protection. As "mature individuals" they "are capable
of recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and discounting it." Id. at
1313. There is no way, however, that voters could "recognize a forged docu-
ment 'for what it is'... since, by definition, it has been altered to appear to be
that which it is not." Id. at 1314. In such cases, therefore, Board intervention
is warranted. Id. at 1313.
22. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
23. See id. at 620.
24. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
25. See id. at 133.
26. See Mosey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 701 F.2d at 611.
27. See id. at 611-12.
28. Id. at 612.
29. See id.
30. Id.
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Life again reversed its position in overruling General Knit and
reinstating Shopping Kart.31 This time, however, the Board ex-
plicitly stated that it would apply the Midland (i.e., Shopping
Kart) standard "'to all pending cases in whatever stage.' ",32
Despite his recognition that the NLRB clearly has author-
ity to establish labor-election standards,33 that the Board ex-
pressly stated that the Midland/Shopping Kart standard should
be applied to all pending cases, 34 and that Mosey was a pending
case,35 Judge Posner held that Mosey was so "unusual" that the
court could not be certain that the NLRB intended the new
rule to apply in this instance. 36 He elaborated:
More than five years have passed since the union won the election by
one vote. No one knows whether the carpenters' union is still pre-
ferred by a majority of the bargaining unit-it may be, but equally it
may not be. In addition, by twice during this proceeding changing its
mind as to the applicable standard the Board has put Mosey through
the hoops, subjecting it to protracted legal expense and uncertainty
(though at the same time, it must be admitted, allowing the company
to stave off the evil day when it must bargain with the union). We
cannot be certain that if this case is remanded the Board will apply
Shopping Kart and order the company to bargain with a union that
won an election by one vote, perhaps procured through misrepresen-
tations, many years ago.
3 7
The first time the standard was changed, the court had re-
manded the case to the NLRB for elucidation. This time, how-
ever, Judge Posner refused to remand because the Board's
inability to decide on an appropriate standard for policing elec-
tions already had delayed a decision for too long.3 8 To avoid
further unconscionable delay, the court ruled on the case as
though the latest shift had not occurred.39 Judge Posner thus
31. Id
32. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 n.24 (1982) (quoting
Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995, 1007 (1958)).
33. Judge Posner stated: "[We may assume, as no contrary argument is
made, that the Board has the broadest power to make rules for election dis-
putes, to change those rules, to apply a changed rule retroactively, and to do
all this in adjudicative decisions rather than in formal rulemaking proceed-
ings." Mosey, 701 F.2d at 612.
The Supreme Court has clearly held that the NLRB possesses broad dis-
cretion in establishing labor-election safeguards and procedures. See NLRB v.
A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946).
34. See Mosey, 701 F.2d at 612.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id-
38. See id
39. As Judge Posner explained:
In these circumstances, unless we can properly enforce the Board's
[Vol. 69:881
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overruled the NLRB's finding that there had been no material
misrepresentations and, applying the rule of Hollywood Ceram-
ics, denied enforcement of the NLRB bargaining order.40
B. INADEQUATE FINDINGS, UNCLEAR STANDARDS, AND THE
SMALL EMPLOYER: NLRB v. VILLAGE IX, INC
As NLRB v. Village IX, Inc.4 demonstrates, Judge Pos-
order without a remand, we shall deny enforcement outright. In ask-
ing us to enforce its order the Board is appealing to our equitable
powers. . , and we must ask what equity the Board would have if,
after again ordering the company to bargain with the union, it came
back to us asking for enforcement of its order. The election would
still have been won by only one vote, but not five years ago, rather six
or seven, the whole interval due mainly to the Board's inability to de-
cide what standard to use in policing elections-it has changed its col-
lective mind three times in the last three and a half years. When a
party asking a court to do equity has strung out the proceeding to the
point where the court cannot determine whether equitable relief
would achieve the legitimate purposes of the suit, which in this case is
to give a unit of Mosey's workers the collective bargaining representa-
tive of their choice, the court will withhold its assistance.... The
best protection for these workers' freedom of choice would be a
prompt new election, which a remand will not accomplish.
I& at 613 (citations omitted). Judge Posner continued: "A shorter Board-
caused delay in an election that was not nearly so close persuaded the Second
Circuit recently to deny enforcement of the Board's bargaining order outright
rather than to remand.. . ." Id. (citing NLRB v. Connecticut Foundry Co.,
688 F.2d 871, 881 (2d Cir. 1982)).
40. See i. at 615. Three judges disagreed with Judge Posner's approach;
one concurred and two dissented. Judge Richard Cudahy's dissent is particu-
larly insightful and exposes the weaknesses in Judge Posner's analysis. Judge
Cudahy sharply criticized the majoritys "extraordinary exercise of judicial ac-
tivism," see id. at 616 (Cudahy, J., dissenting), and he contended that the court
had substituted its own judgment for that of the Board, see id. (Cudahy, J., dis-
senting). He added that the NLRB had clearly stated that its ruling in Mid-
land should be applied retroactively, and thus there was no need to remand.
See id. at 617 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
Even if a remand were necessary, Judge Cudahy strongly disagreed with
Judge Posner's finding that the application of equitable principles should pre-
clude a remand. In Judge Cudahy's view, it was the employees who had been
put "through the hoops" by their employer rather than the employer by the
Board. Judge Cudahy noted that the employer, by filing various appeals, had
been able to avoid bargaining with the union for years and that the Seventh
Circuit's first review of the June 1977 election did not come until March 27,
1979. See id. at 617 & n.1 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). He concluded:
I see nothing equitable about a result which, when all is said and
done, results in these employees losing their statutory right to repre-
sentation because the majority is annoyed at the "fickleness" of the
Board. I think that such an outcome has no sanction in the Act or in
the decided cases.
I& at 617 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
41. 723 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983).
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ner's judicial activism is not confined to situations in which the
NLRB has repeatedly changed its position over a short period
of time. In Village IX, the employer had opened a restaurant
called Shenanigans in late 1979. Several months later, a wait-
ress at the restaurant began organizing employees on behalf of
the United Retail Workers Union.42 Twenty-eight of the res-
taurant's forty-seven employees signed union authorization
cards, and a representation election was scheduled. 43 After the
union lost by a vote of twenty-eight to twelve,44 it accused the
employer of unfairly resisting unionization. The NLRB found
that the employer committed a variety of unfair labor practices,
including assaulting a union organizer, discharging an employee
for union activities, enforcing overly broad bans on employee
distribution of union materials, and delivering coercive
speeches to the employees.45 Because of these extensive unfair
practices, the NLRB invalidated the election result and ordered
the employer to bargain with the union.46 The employer ap-
pealed the Board's decision to the Seventh Circuit, and the
NLRB cross-petitioned for enforcement of its bargaining
order.47
Although Judge Posner upheld a majority of the NLRB's
unfair-practice findings,48 he disagreed with the Board's finding
that a speech by the employer to the employees was unlawfully
coercive. The employer had asserted that restaurants in the
town could not afford to pay union wages and that a union at
Shenanigans would likely drive it out of business.49 The ulti-
mate issue was whether the employer's speech was a threat and
thus unlawful under section 8(c)50 or merely a lawful predic-
tion of adverse consequences. 51
42. Id at 1364.
43. Id- at 1365.
44. See id
45. See id. at 1364-65.
46. See id at 1363.
47. See id at 1363-64.
48. Judge Posner agreed that the employer had discharged an employee
and assaulted a union organizer because of their union activities, see id. at
1365, and had enforced unlawfully broad restrictions on employee distribution
of union materials, see id at 1365-67.
49. See i& at 1364. The employer referred to the union as a "cancer" that
will "eat us up" and cause the business to "fall by the wayside." See id.
50. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982); in-
fra text accompanying note 96.
51. As Judge Posner explained the issue:
On the one hand it is apparent from section 8(c) of the Act ... and
from the use of the electoral process to determine representation, that
[Vol. 69:881
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Although Judge Posner conceded that there is a fine line
between unlawful threats and lawful predictions5 and that
courts have differed on where that line is drawn,s3 he found
that the "Board's conclusions that [the employer's] speech was
coercive is not supported by substantial evidence." 4 Judge Pos-
ner noted that the employer's speech "offered a competent if
extremely informal analysis of likely economic consequences of
unionization in a highly competitive market in which most
companies are not unionized-the restaurant market in Deca-
tur" s and that it "is well known that union wage demands
sometimes result in plant closings." s6 Judge Posner also cited a
recent empirical study5 7 that concluded that employer cam-
the company has a right to state its side of the case. On the other
hand the company may not threaten retaliation against workers for
voting for the union, and a potent form of retaliation is to close down
the plant or facility, thereby throwing all the workers out of work.
Since the only effective way of arguing against the union is for the
company to point out to the workers the adverse consequences of
unionization, one of which might be closure, it is often difficult in
practice to distinguish between lawful advocacy and threats of retalia-
tion. ... Analytically, however, the line is clear. To predict a conse-
quence that will occur no matter how well disposed the company is
toward unions is not to threaten retaliation; to predict a consequence
that will occur because the company wants to punish the workers for
voting for the union-a consequence desired and freely chosen by the
company rather than compelled by economic forces over which it has
no control-is.
Village 1X 723 F.2d at 1367 (citations omitted). For many years, the Board in-
terpreted the NLRA to prohibit all antiunion speeches by employers because
it believed that such speeches inhibited union activities. The 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments added § 8(c) to the Act in order to reduce the restrictions on em-
ployer speech. According to § 8(c), union or employer speech is not an unfair
labor practice unless it contains a "threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit." Se4 eg., NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941) (holding
that arguments by an employer to its employees about unions and unionism
may constitute an unfair labor practice); Comment, Labor Law Reform.- The
Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB Representation Elec-
tions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 756-58 (1979); see also Note, Employer Free
Speech in Union Organizing Campaigns, 15 U. FLA. L, REv. 231 (1962) (re-
viewing developments leading to the enactment of § 8(c) and suggesting guide-
lines for employers).
52. See Village IX 723 F.2d at 1367.
53. See ii. at 1368-69.
54. See ii. at 1369.
55. See id. at 1367.
56. See id at 1368. Judge Posner also pointed out that the gradual reloca-
tion of industry from the North to the South apparently resulted from the
lower rate of unionization in the South. See id.
57. J. GErMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 111-20 (1976).
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paign speeches "do not swing many votes."5 8 A major factor in
Judge Posner's decision, however, apparently was his belief
that the employer's statement was plausibly based on objective
fact, and hence that the Board was being too harsh on a small
restaurant in Decatur, Illinois. He commented:
A small company in the restaurant business should not have to hire a
high-powered consultant to make an econometric forecast of the prob-
able consequences of unionization on the restaurant business in Deca-
tur. The usual assumption that employers hold all the cards In
dealing with employees is reversed when a large national union is
waging an organizational campaign against a small service company.59
Once again, Judge Posner intervened to prevent the NLRB
from putting the employer "through the hoops."
In addition to overturning the Board's finding that the em-
ployer's speech constituted an illegal threat, Judge Posner criti-
cized the Board's use of a bargaining-order remedy.60 He
chastised the Board "for its stubborn refusal . . . to make ade-
quate findings to support the issuance of a bargaining order in
cases where the union, having lost the election, cannot be con-
sidered the presumptive choice of the employees to bargain
with the employer on their behalf."'6 ' Judge Posner com-
mented that even if the court had upheld all of the NLRB's un-
fair-practice determinations, the inadequate factual record
would have "provide[d] a compelling argument" for a remand
to the Board.6 2 Because the court overturned some of the
Board's unfair labor practice determinations, "the Board itself
might not believe that the remaining [unfair practices] justified
[issuance of a bargaining order]" and, thus, "the argument for
remand is even stronger. '6 3 Nonetheless, Judge Posner refused
to remand Village IX to the NLRB. Instead, he asserted, the
Seventh Circuit chose to make its own determination of
whether a bargaining order is warranted because the court "de-
spair[ed] that the Board could be induced to make adequate
findings in bargaining-order cases. '64
58. See Village IX, 723 F.2d at 1368.
59. Id.
60. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the Supreme
Court held that the NLRB can issue remedial bargaining orders whenever the
union has established majority support at some point, usually through authori-
zation cards, and the employer's unfair practices are so pervasive that it would
not be feasible to hold a new election.
61. See Village IX, 723 F.2d at 1370.
62. See id.
63. Id
64. See id. Somewhat remarkably, Judge Posner explicitly recognized
that the failure to remand in such instances might not be "fully consistent"
[Vol. 69:881
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Inl making his own determination of the factual adequacy
of the 'Board's findings, Judge Posner pointed to documentation
of thei Board's overuse of the bargaining-order remedy3' and
found that the employer's unfair practices were not sufficiently
egregious to merit the issuance of a bargaining order.6 Judge
Posner emphasized that it had been several years since the
union had obtained an authorization-card majority and that it
had lost the representation election in January 1981 by a signif-
icant majority. Under those circumstances, the judge con-
cluded, it would be "reckless" to assume that the union was the
preferred collective-bargaining representative of the restau-
with the Supreme Court's holding in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1940),
"which, applied to the [NLRB's] regulatory domain, is that the making of la-
bor policy is for the Board and not the courts." See Village ZX, 723 F.2d at
1370. Judge Posner continued:
But it is consistent with Chenery for us to determine whether the
Board, if it issued a bargaining order on the basis of the unfair labor
practice findings, would be exceeding its authority;, for if it would be,
then a remand to let it decide whether to reissue the order---an order
we would have to set aside on the company's appeal from it-would
be a complete waste of time, and ... Chenery does not require point-
less remands.
Id (citing Illinois v. ICC, 722 F.2d 1341,1348-49 (7th Cir. 1983)).
65. See Village 1_ 723 F.2d at 1371 (citing J. GETmAN, S. GOLDBERG & J.
HERMAN, supra note 57, at 113-16).
66. See id at 1370-72. Judge Posner explained-
To require a company to negotiate for a collective bargaining con-
tract with a union that has lost a representation election is an ex-
treme remedy, reserved for extreme cases .... It goes against the
grain of the National Labor Relations Act, which requires a company
to negotiate only with a representative elected by majority vote of the
members of the bargaining unit. Few would argue that if one of the
political parties tried improperly to discourage voting for another
party and the other party lost, the losing party's candidate should nev-
ertheless be awarded the office he was seeking... In any event, to
give employees a collective bargaining representative that they do not
want, as a way of punishing their employer for committing unfair la-
bor practices, is so discordant with the basic philosophy of the Act
that a bargaining order will not (except in the most egregious cases,
and maybe not even then... ) be issued unless the union had a card
majority and the unfair labor practices were so serious that employees
would be intimidated from voting their true preferences in a new
election even if no unfair labor practices were committed in the cam-
paign leading up to that election and even though the new election
(like the old) would be by secret ballot. We have held these condi-
tions satisfied only where the employer's unfair labor practices were
both serious and numerous .. ,where the six categories of unfair
labor practices in which the employer was found to engage must have
included many separate violations, or... where we described the em-
ployer's unfair labor practices as "pervasive."
Id. at 1370-71 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
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rant's employees in 1984.67
C. SUPERVISORS, PROUNION BIAS, AND RULE MAKING: NLRB
v. RES-CARE, INC. AND NLRB v. AMERICAN MEDICAL
SERVICES, INC.
In the companion cases NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc.68 and NLRB
v. American Medical Services, Inc.,6 9 Judge Posner once again
disregarded the NLRB's fact-finding expertise and took it upon
himself to determine whether nurses were employees or super-
visors for purposes of the NLRA.7 0 As the judge noted in Res-
Care, such determinations are "technically" issues of fact on
which the judgments of the NLRB are generally accorded def-
erence. 71 Nevertheless, Judge Posner refused to defer to the
Board's findings of fact in these cases, choosing instead to en-
gage in exhaustive factual analyses before upholding the
Board's ruling in Res-Care72 that the nurses were employees,
and thus covered by the Act, and reversing a determination
that the nurses were employees in American Medical
Services.73
Judge Posner based his reluctance to defer to the Board's
findings on his beliefs that the Board's procedures were defi-
cient and that the Board was philosophically biased. He chas-
tised the NLRB for not using its section 6 rule-making power 74
to adopt rules for applying the Act's statutory exclusion of su-
pervisors to the medical field.7 5 This criticism, however, does
not justify his refusal to defer. The Supreme Court held over a
decade ago in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.76 that the Board
could develop rules on a case-by-case basis instead of relying on
67. See id at 1372.
68. 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983).
69. 705 F.2d 1472 (7th Cir. 1983).
70. National Labor Relations Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982); injfra
text accompanying note 111.
71. See Res-Care, 705 F.2d at 1466.
72. See id at 1468.
73. See American Medical Services, 705 F.2d at 1475.
74. Section 6 provides: "The Board shall have authority from time to time
to make, amend, and rescind ... such rules and regulations as may be neces-
sary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." National Labor Relations
Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
75. According to Judge Posner, if the NLRB "had awakened its dormant
rulemaking powers for the purpose of particularizing the application of section
2(11) to the medical field," it would have been entitled to greater deference in
this case. See Res-Care, 705 F.2d at 1466 (citation omitted).
76. 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974).
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rule making.7 7 Judge Posner, however, believed that the reli-
ance on adjudication was particularly troublesome here because
it allowed the Board to put employers "through the hoops":
By dealing with the issue entirely on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, the
Board has laid itself open to charges that its decisions applying section
2(11) have been more than tinged by opportunism-that it construes
"supervisor" broadly when the question is whether an employee's un-
lawful act can be imputed to the employer and narrowly when the
question is whether the employee is protected by the Act.7 8
Thus, in Judge Posner's opinion, it was once again necessary for
the court to intervene to ensure that the Board correctly inter-
preted the NLRA.79
77. Judge Posner, however, is not alone in his criticism of the NLRB for
not using its rule-making powers more directly. See eg., Bernstein, The
NLRB's Adjudication-Rulemaking Dilemma Under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of
the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); Comment, Shop-
ping Kart: The Need for a Broader Approach to the Problems of Campaign
Regulation, 56 N.C.L. REV. 389, 403-04 (1978).
78. Res-Care, 705 F.2d at 1466 (citations omitted).
79. Judge Posner apparently believed that the Board had not given suffi-
cient consideration to the Taft-Hartley Act's exclusion of supervisors from
NLRA coverage. Indeed, in Judge Posner's view, the Taft-Hartley Act's treat-
ment of supervisors represented an important feature of the Act's attempt to
restore "balance" to national labor policy. See id. at 1465. Because unions, ac-
cording to the judge, enforce their cartel power through the strike, the ability
of employers to use supervisors to replace strikers is a significant component
-of the current NLRA. See id. at 1465; Posner, supra note 3, at 997-98. As
Judge Posner stated in Res-Care.
To understand the statutory definition of "supervisor" you must un-
derstand its role in the overall scheme of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. The Wagner Act was of course intended to promote
unionization. ... Taft-Hartley applied some brakes, so that the bal-
ance of power between companies and unions would not shift wholly
to the union side. If supervisors were free to join or form unions and
enjoy the broad protection of the Act for concerted activity,. . . the
impact of a strike would be greatly amplified because the company
would not be able to use its supervisory personnel to replace strikers.
More important, the company-with or without a strike-could lose
the control of its work force to the unions, since the very people in
the company who controlled hiring, discipline, assignments, and the
other dimensions of the employment relationship might be subject to
control by the same union as the employees they were supposed to be
controlling on the employer's behalf. We might become a nation of
worker-controlled firms. Syndicalism is not the theory of the
amended National Labor Relations Act.
705 F.2d at 1465.
Posner's belief that the United States would become a nation of "worker-
controlled firms" if supervisors were granted bargaining rights is questionable.
Professor Clyde Summers has recently argued for the granting of such bar-
gaining rights to supervisors. Summers notes that other industrial nations, in-
cluding Sweden, France, and West Germany, clearly recognize that
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D. AN ANOMALY?: EAST CHICAGO REHABILITATION CENTER V.
NLRB
East Chicago Rehabilitation Center v. NLRB80 at first ap-
pears to be a clear anomaly among Judge Posner's opinions.
The case involved a spontaneous two-hour walkout by nurses'
aides at a nursing home. The nursing home fired the striking
employees, who then filed charges with the NLRB alleging that
they had been engaged in activity protected by the NLRA and
that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice by
firing them.81 In examining the employees' claim, the Board
distinguished wildcat strikes that undermine a union's position
as the exclusive bargaining agent, and thus are not protected as
concerted activity under the Act, from wildcat strikes that do
not undermine the union, and thus are protected. 82 The Board
"supervisors should have the same right to bargain collectively as other em-
ployees." See Summers, Past Premises, Present Failure, and Future Needs in
Labor Legislation, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 9, 23 (1982) (footnote omitted). He em-
phasizes that the special relationship of these employees to the firm and to
their subordinates can be accommodated by requiring that they be represented
through separate unions, as plant guards currently are. See id. See generally
Goldberg, Empirical Research in Labor Law: Problems, Prospects, and
Pleasures, 1981 U. Iii. L.F. 15, 28 (questioning the validity of the assumptions
that influenced Congress to exclude supervisors from the protection of the
NLRA).
80. 710 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1414 (1984).
81. See 710 F.2d at 399-400. The broad language of § 7 protects the right to
engage in wildcat strikes: "Employees shall have the right ... to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection ... " National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1982).
82. Judge Posner explained the distinction:
Section 9(a) makes the "representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in
a unit appropriate for such purposes ... the exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment .... " Thus, if the 17 workers had
been striking to enforce a demand that the company bargain with
them, rather than with the union, over where they could eat lunch,
the strike would not have been protected by the provision in section 7
that "employees shall have the right ... to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing. . . ." But that is not
what the workers were doing. Their spontaneous, unorganized walk-
out in protest against the company's unilateral change in the condi-
tions of their employment was not an effort to butt their way into the
bargaining process but an instance of what section 7 protects under
the rubric of "other concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual
aid or protection."
East Chicago, 710 F.2d at 400 (quoting National Labor Relations Act §§ 9(a), 7,
29 U.S.C. §§ 159(a), 157 (1982)) (ellipses in East Chicago).
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determined that the walkout did not undermine the union. It
therefore ruled that the discharges were unfair practices and
ordered the employees reinstated with back pay.s3
Judge Posner upheld the NLRB's ruling. Indeed, he
added, in curiously approbatory language, that "the Board
rather than the courts should be the innovator" with respect to
this issue.84 He then went on to explain that the Board
can reconcile the policies of section 7 with those of section 9(a), can
harmonize the Act's discordant themes of the rights of employees as
individuals and the rights of unions as collectivities, better than we-
who maybe cannot do it at all We have no guides to judgment in this
area.85
Despite the laudatory language, Judge Posner's ruling in
East Chicago can be reconciled with his other, less deferential,
holdings. As Judge Posner explained:
Although the concept of administrative agency expertise has a large
fictive component, there is no denying that the Board knows more
than we do about the impact of wildcat strikes on unions and employ-
ers; and we are not much worried that the Board's all too frequent
bias toward unions will prejudice it in this area against employers,
since a wildcat strike will often (the petitioner would say always) hurt
the union as well as the employer. Therefore, if the Board chooses to
distinguish between wildcat strikes that undermine the union's posi-
tion as exclusive collective bargaining representative and ones that do
not, as it did in this case and has done in others,. .. we must let it-s s
Thus, when the NLRB's perceived bias toward unions comes to
83. See ici at 400.
84. See id at 402.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 402-03 (citations omitted). Judge Coffey issued a sharp dissent,
accusing the majority of "concentrating solely on the interests of employees to
the exclusion of the interests of the employer as well as the public," see East
Chicago, 710 F.2d at 406 (Coffey, J., dissenting), and of making "a mockery of
Congress' intent to strike a fair balance between the interests of employers
and employees," see id. (Coffey, J., dissenting). Judge Coffey contended that
Judge Posner was overly deferential to the NLRB. He statech
[Tihe excessive deference afforded by the majority to the NLRB is
particularly injudicious since this case involves a "wildcat" strike in
the health care field which, like police and fire departments, provides
vital services, rather than in the usual industrial setting with which
the NLRB is more accustomed and has accumulated a certain
expertise.
Id- at 407 (Coffey, J., dissenting). He concluded:
Judge Posner's cool and detached analysis treats this case as though
we were considering a walkout occurring on an assembly line, in a
steel mill or in a coal mine, where at most an interruption in produc-
tion would result. Rather, I dissent as I believe it is important to em-
phasize that this walkout occurred in the health care field, where
human lives are all too frequently hanging in the balance.... Fi-
nally, I disagree with the majority's decision because, in holding that
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the fore in a case, Judge Posner would emphasize the "large
fictive component" of the Board's administrative expertise. In
such cases, broad federal court intervention may be necessary
to ensure that the "balance" called for in the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments is enforced. In cases such as East Chicago, how-
ever, in which the Board's possible prounion bias cannot influ-
ence the decision, the Board's expertise is somewhat less
"fictive." Thus, judicial intervention is not as necessary as
when the NLRB is "putting employers through the hoops."
III. LABOR-REFORM ISSUES RAISED BY
JUDGE POSNER'S APPROACH
Judge Posner's approach to NLRA cases has important
public-policy implications beyond the conflict between the
courts and the Board. In particular, his approach has focused
attention on potential problems with the NLRA and the
Board's administration of this Act, thereby raising again the is-
sue of legislative reform. Despite the role played by the NLRB
and the federal courts in interpreting and administering the
NLRA, ultimate responsibility for the Act lies with Congress.
Congress gave considerable attention to the issue of NLRA re-
form in 1977 and 1978, but the labor-reform bill passed by the
House of Representatives was successfully filibustered in the
Senate.8 7 Judge Posner's views and his judicial activism may
well revive the congressional reform effort. This section criti-
cally analyzes various labor-reform issues raised by Judge Pos-
ner's view that the NLRB's prounion bias misconstrues the
NLRA.
A. REDUCING NLRB BIAS BY CLARIFYING THE NLRA
As is true of many statutes, the NLRA is sufficiently vague
to allow differing and even contradictory interpretations. This
problem is accentuated in the NLRA, however, because the
Taft-Hartley Act of 194788 only imperfectly achieved its goal of
this "wildcat" strike was protected activity, the majority disregards an
overwhelming weight of prior case law.
Id at 406 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
87. A comprehensive labor law reform bill was passed by the House of
Representatives in 1977, see 123 CONG. REC. 32,613 (1977), but a successful fili-
buster in the Senate in 1978 forced this legislation off the floor, see 124 CONG.
REc. 18,397-400 (1978). For a complete listing of the proposed bills, see Com-
ment, supra note 51, at 755 & n.1.
88. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982)).
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removing a prounion bias from the 1935 Wagner Act.8 9 As a re-
sult, the NLRA occasionally is unclear. For example, section 1
of the Act declares that United States labor policy is one of
"encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing."90 At the same time, section 7, as amended in 1947, states
that employees have both the right to join unions through
which they can bargain collectively and the right to refrain
from joining such unions.9 1 These provisions, which do not ex-
plain how to encourage collective bargaining without encourag-
ing unionization,9 2 exemplify the general tension between
various provisions of the Act.
A total revision of the statute to completely clarify Ameri-
can labor policy would be difficult and impractical. It would re-
quire Congress to determine precisely what the primary goal of
American labor policy should be and to implement that objec-
tive despite the opposition of those who prefer the current
vagueness.93 To avoid such problems, however, Congress could
clarify those NLRA provisions that create the most confusion.
A good starting point would be section 8(c),9 4 which was
passed by Congress in 1947 specifically to overrule previous
NLRB holdings that any antiunion speech by an employer con-
89. Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
90. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
91. Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted ac-
tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment ....
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
92. This argument is not meant to be simplistic. It can be argued that
Congress, in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, was only trying to give employees
a "free choice" not to undercut the promotion of collective bargaining. Never-
theless, the "spirit" of Taft-Hartley certainly runs counter to the notions of
the Wagner Act in this regard, and the general perception is that the Taft-
Hartley amendments made the NLRA less "prounion." See, eg., Posner, supra
note 3, at 1010-11; supm text accompanying notes 9-10. For an interesting ex-
position of the view that the NLRA is still clearly designed to encourage col-
lective bargaining, see Summers, supra note 79, at 9-18.
93. See M. HAYEs, LOBBYISTS AND LEGisLToRs: A THEORY OF POLTCAL
MARKEr 28 (1981).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
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stitutes an unfair labor practice.95 Section 8(c) provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemina-
tion thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form,
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under
any provision of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
9 6
As Judge Posner noted in Village IX, 97 however, a precise defi-
nition of a "threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit" is
not readily available.95 A statement that is a threat to one per-
son might be viewed as only a prediction of consequences to
another.99
These divergent interpretations allow biases to influence
decisions. Judge Posner's perception of a prounion bias there-
fore may be accurate with regard to speech issues; one com-
mentator has observed that "one general Board rule is that
'promises of benefit' by an employer will constitute an unfair
labor practice, while such promises by a union will not."'0 0 If it
is true, as a recent empirical study has shown, that pre-election
speeches have little effect on the results of labor-representation
elections,10 1 then overturning election results and mandating
that the employer bargain with the union on the basis of a
threatening speech may be particularly unfortunate.
Any problem of NLRB exploitation of vague statutory lan-
guage can be remedied by clearly focused reform. For example,
inequitable NLRB interpretations of section 8(c) could be mini-
mized by adding statutory language explicitly stating that the
section applies to threats and promises of benefit made by un-
ions as well as to those made by employers. Another approach
might be to retain the existing section but to add language spec-
ifying in more detail what type of speech is protected by the
Act. The proposal of Senators Hatch and Tower during the
1977-1978 congressional attempt to reform the NLRA provides
one example of possible clarification:
95. See generally Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations
Act 61 HARV. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1947).
96. National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
97. See NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983); supra
notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
98. See id. at 1367.
99. For example, Professor Archibald Cox notes that employees in differ-
ent trades in different parts of the country may perceive the same statement
quite differently. See A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 44
(1960).
100. See Comment, supra note 51, at 763; see also id. at n.51 (citing cases).
101. See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 57, at 111-30.
Judge Posner cited this study in his Village IX opinion. See 723 F.2d at 1368.
[Vol. 69:881
LABOR LAW REFORM
The expressing of any views, argument, opinion, or the making of any
statement (including expressions intended to influence the outcome
of an organizing campaign, a bargaining controversy, a strike, lockout,
or other labor dispute), or the dissemination thereof, whether in writ-
ten, printed, graphic, visual, or auditory form, shall not (i) constitute
or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions
of this Act... if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit
1 0 2
Such clarification, of course, will not solve the entire
speech problem because it leaves untouched the NLRB's prac-
tice of overruling election results even when no threat has been
found if the Board finds that "laboratory conditions" were not
maintained. The laboratory-conditions doctrine was established
in the 1948 case of General Shoe Corp.,'03 in which the NLRB
explained that "[i]n election proceedings, it is the Board's func-
tion to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be
conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to de-
termine the uninhibited desires of the employees."'" ° When
such conditions are not met, the election will be set aside and
"the experiment. . conducted over again."' 0 5
102. See S. 1855, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6, reprinted in Labor Reform Act of
1977 Hearings on S. 1883 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm.
on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
103. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). Before the passage of the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments in 1947, the NLRB usually did not set aside representation elections on
the basis of a pre-election speech unless that speech constituted an unfair la-
bor practice. See, eg., Hercules Motor Corp., 73 N.L.R.B. 605, 654 (1947); M.T.
Stevens & Sons, 68 N.L.RIB. 229, 231 (1946). Although Congress clearly in-
tended to protect certain speech by enacting § 8(c), it did not consider whether
the newly protected speech, which would not be an unfair labor practice,
might nonetheless interfere with the holding of a free and fair representation
election. See Note, Free Speech and Free Choice in Representation Elections"
Effect of Tart-Hartley Act Section 8(c), 58 YALE L.J. 165, 174 (1948). In Gen-
eral Shoe, the Board found such a distinction. See 77 N.L.R.B. at 126.
104. General Shoe, 77 N.L.R.B. at 127. In General Shoe, small groups of
employees had been propagandized in their homes and had been called to the
employer's office the day before the election to hear an antiunion speech. rcL
at 125-26. The employer's statements contained no threats of force or reprisal
or promises of benefit and did not constitute an unfair labor practice. Id. at
126. Nonetheless, the Board set aside the election because it determined that
those activities created an atmosphere that prevented a free choice by employ-
ees. See id
105. 1& The courts have upheld the Board's "laboratory conditions" test
when challenged on first amendment grounds. See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v.
NLRB, 451 F.2d 873, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1971).
The NLBB's application of its laboratory-conditions doctrine has not been
entirely consistent. For example, the more conservative and generally less
prounion Eisenhower, Nixon-Ford, and Reagan Boards have enforced the doc-
trine with considerably less vigor than did the Kennedy-Johnson and Carter
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Of course, as with the problem of vague statutory language,
Congress could rectify some of Judge Posner's concerns about
undue NLRB bias and remedy the inconsistency with regard to
speech by amending the NLRA to expressly overrule the labo-
ratory-conditions doctrine and thus further clarify congres-
sional intent with regard to section 8(c).10 6
B. REDUCING NLRB BIAS BY MANDATING RULE MAKING
Lack of statutory clarity is not the only reason for appar-
ent NLRB bias in the application of the NLRA. Another
source of the problem, as exemplified by Judge Posner's allega-
tion of differential application of the "supervisors" test in Res-
Care10 7 and American Medical Services,10 8 is the Board's devel-
opment and application of tests on a case-by-case basis.'0 9 The
NLRB originally interpreted the NLRA to include all supervi-
sors, and the Supreme Court upheld that view in Packard Mo-
tor Car Co. v. NLRB." 0  Congress, however, overturned
Packard in 1947 with an amendment defining the term "super-
visor" for the purposes of the Act and excluding supervisors
from NLRA protection. That amendment provides:
Boards. Compare, for example, National Furniture Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B.
1300 (1953) (Eisenhower Board) with Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782
(1962) (Kennedy Board). See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tac-
tics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78
HARV. L. REv. 38, 39-41 (1964) (discussing the general instability of this area of
law). The Mosey case, for instance, arose in part in the context of the Reagan
Board's deregulatory reversal in Midland National Life of the Carter Board's
holding in the General Knit case. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying
text. For an interesting discussion of the development of the law in this area
up to General Knit, see Aldrich & Carlson, One Step Forward and Two Steps
Back- The Shopping Kart--General Knit Dance, 32 MERCER L. REV. 743
(1981).
106. It is difficult to imagine that Congress, in enacting § 8(c) to protect
employer free speech, ever had any idea that the NLRB would avoid its statu-
tory mandate by developing the laboratory-conditions doctrine. Legislative
clarification would help fulfill Congress's original deregulatory intent in enact-
ing § 8(c). In taking such action, however, Congress must be extremely explicit
about what it is trying to do lest the door be left open for some form of future
Board regulation. For example, § 8(c)'s language currently applies only to
"[t]he expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof." Thus, if misrepresentations of fact or other campaign statements
now intended to be regulated by the section could be characterized as falling
outside this definition, the regulation might not be effective. Care must be
taken to guard against this.
107. 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983).
108. 705 F.2d 1472 (7th Cir. 1983).
109. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
110. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
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The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, pro-
mote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the ex-
ercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature,
but requires the use of independent judgment l "
Judge Posner and other NLRA critics believe, however,
that even precise definitions cannot lead to consistent results
when they are unevenly applied." 2 One way of achieving equal
application, according to Judge Posner, is for the NLRB to rely
more heavily on rule making rather than reaching policy deci-
sions on an ad hoc basis.n 3 Although no process can assure un-
biased administrative-agency interpretation, reliance on rule
making can make unbiased interpretations more likely because
it will force policy determinations to be made explicitly and
openly, with full opportunity for public comment and debate.n
4
Moreover, as Professor Samuel Estreicher recently noted, rule
making would assure that the widest spectrum of views are
heard and considered before highly controversial policy deci-
sions are made." 5 Even if an apparently one-sided policy re-
sulted from such a process, therefore, those potentially harmed
by it have at least had an opportunity to influence the decision.
The benefits of rule making are sufficiently important that
Congress should reconsider that part of the 1978 Labor Reform
Act that would require the Board to promulgate rules for estab-
11l. National Labor Relations Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982).
112. See e.g., Note, The NLRB and Supervisory Status: An Explanation of
Inconsistent Results, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1713 (1981); see also M.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-17 (1947); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5
(1947). See generally NLRB v. Southern Plasma Corp., 626 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir.
1980).
113. See NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1466 (7th Cir. 1983); infra
notes 74-79 and accompanying text. Drafters of the attempted 1977-1978 Labor
Reform Act agreed with this belief. See MR. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 6(b)(1) & (2), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 102, at 5-6; S. 1883, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(1) & (2), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 102, at 28-29.
See generally Parker & Gilmore, The Unfair Labor Practice Caseload: An
Analysis of Selected Remedies, 34 LAB. L.J. 172, 173 (1983). The Board can
continue developing new "rules" by adjudication unless Congress intervenes to
tell the Board to do it differently.
114. See Rulemaking as Aid in NLRB Policy Reversals, 116 LAB. REL- REP.
(BNA) 142-44 (June 25, 1984) (statements of New York University Law Pro-
fessor Samuel Estreicher) [hereinafter cited as Rulemaking]. See generally
Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REv. 93, 105-
06 (1955) (contending that, although the Board has rule-making power, it re-
lies on adjudication as an "ill-adapted" substitute).
115. See Rulemaking, supra note 114, at 142.
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lishing appropriate collective-bargaining units and for develop-
ing regulatory standards for labor elections.11 6 In support of
these amendments, both the House and Senate Labor Commit-
tees stated: "There is no labor relations issue on which there
has been such a strong consensus of scholarly opinion as on the
proposition that the Board should make greater use of its rule-
making authority under Section 6 of the Act. 11 7 Congress
should draw on that consensus to enact this reform.
C. REDUCING NLRB BIAS BY ALTERING THE STRUCTURE AND
ROLE OF THE BOARD
Another asserted basis for inconsistency is the changing
political composition of the NLRB. The Board consists of five
members, appointed by the President and serving staggered
five-year terms. Although the current nonstatutory practice
maintains political balance by having no more than three mem-
bers from the same political party,""' that practice only mini-
mizes the extent of the shift because, as one former Board
member explained, "political labels are of no meaning whatso-
ever." 1 9 A President can appoint a conservative Democrat or a
liberal Republican and meet the political-party-balance test and
yet create a clear ideological imbalance within the agency.
Thus, codification of current practice, as proposed in the 1977-
1978 reform efforts, would do nothing to solve the problem of
the Board's shifting political composition. 120
If the purpose of political-party balance is to achieve ideo-
116. See H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(1) & (2), reprinted in Hear-
ings, supra note 102, at 5-6; S. 1883, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(1) & (2), re-
printed in Hearings, supra note 102, at 28-29.
117. See S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 637,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977).
118. See H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1977).
119. See Walther, Suggestions and Comments on the Future Direction of
the NLRB, 34 LAB. L.J. 215, 228 (1983). It does seem, however, that formal
political-party limitations do put a political check on administrative-agency
makeup, at least in extreme cases. For example, the Senate recently rejected
the nomination of a purported "Democrat" to a "Democratic" seat on the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, at least in part because of a feeling that President
Reagan, in appointing the former director of "Democrats for Reagan," had
pushed things beyond acceptable limits. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1982, at D2,
col. 2; Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1982, at 22, col. 3.
120. The Labor Reform Act of 1978 proposed that Board membership be
expanded from five to seven, that members serve for seven rather than five
years, and that no more than four members of a seven-member Board could
belong to the same political party. See S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 45
(1978); H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1977).
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logical balance within the agency, that purpose might be more
readily achieved by seeking a better indicator of ideological vi-
sion of American labor policy. For example, New Jersey has
created a tripartite labor-relations board consisting of repre-
sentatives from unions, management, and the public. That ap-
proach promises to create greater and more lasting ideological
balance and thus to lessen inconsistency.' 12
A more drastic alternative is to replace the NLRB with a
federal labor court.2 Although a labor court may provide
more consistent enforcement of America's complex employee-
relations laws,32 3 it is not clear that a labor court would be im-
mine from bias. As Professor Benjamin Aaron commented on
a similar proposal in 1969:
Senator Griffin argues that the labor court, shielded from the pres-
sures of partisan politics, would adopt a more "judicious" approach to
the adjudication of labor disputes. But the lifetime appointments of
the justices of the United States Supreme Court have apparently not
accomplished this purpose. Certainly life tenure has not prevented at-
121. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34-13A-5.2 (West Supp. 1983). A tripartite ap-
proach to labor law administration is also common in Europe. See Aaron, La-
bor Courts: Western European Models and Their Significance for the United
States, 16 UCLA L. REv. 847, 854-55 (1969). Another way of encouraging mod-
eration and cooperation between labor and management with respect to
NLRB appointments would be to require such appointments to be "cleared"
by a joint labor-management committee similar to the committee used by the
American Bar Association to evaluate federal judicial appointments. For a dis-
cussion of this general issue and of the type of cooperation that exists in this
regard in other countries, see Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of
American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1448-54 (1971).
122. There was much discussion of this alternative in the middle to late
1960's; the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) asked the Republi-
can Party to include the concept in its 1968 platform and, in 1969, Republican
Senator Robert P. Griffin of Michigan introduced a bill in Congress to estab-
lish a labor court. See S. 103, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 771 (1969);
Aaron, supra note 121, at 847. See generally Morris, The Case for Unitary En-
forcement of Federal Labor Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 472 (1972).
Interest in a labor court at that time was sparked by the perception, espe-
cially prevalent among business leaders, that the "New Frontier" Board ap-
pointed by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson was overtly and unfairly biased
in favor of unions. For a sharp criticism of this Board, see K. MCGUME s, THE
NEw FRONTIE NLRB (1963). Thus, NAM's statement to the 1968 Republican
platform committee asserted that replacing the NLRB with a labor court or
some other court "would minimize administrative policy making and lead to
more even-handed justice in this important area." Aaron, supra note 121, at
847 (footnote omitted). Senator Griffin echoed a similar theme, stating that a
labor court would help keep the administration of the nation's labor laws away
from "partisan politics." See id. at 877.
123. See generally Aaron, Labor Relations Law in the United States from a
Comparative Perspective, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1247, 1258 (1982); Morris,
supra note 122.
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tacks by Senator Griffin and his colleagues against both the wisdom of
their decisions and their integrity. Although the notion that judges
merely "apply" the "law," without regard to their own backgrounds,
prejudices and preconceptions, was discredited long ago, its ghost con-
tinues to plague us.1
24
Such a radical change is not necessary, however, to en-
courage greater consistency; that end may be more readily ac-
complished by relatively minor changes in the compensation
levels and selection procedures for administrative-law judges.
Currently, NLRB administrative-law judges are the first triers
of fact in NLRA cases and their decisions are entitled to defer-
ence by the regulatory agency. 1' Very few of the individuals
selected for these positions, however, have private-sector man-
agement labor-relations experience. 126 One reason is that com-
pensation for administrative-law judges is considerably below
what many private-sector attorneys can earn. 21 Civil-service
requirements and bureaucratic selection procedures, such as a
requirement that the applicant demonstrate two years of litiga-
tion experience during the seven preceding years,128 also con-
tribute to the problem. This requirement excludes many
experienced lawyers because they tend to spend less time in the
courtroom and more time counseling clients as they become
more experienced and successful. 129 The exclusion of lawyers
with management labor-relations experience is unfortunate be-
cause such lawyers might help avert the Board's perceived an-
tiemployer "bias."
IV. REDUCING NLRB BIAS: A CAUTIONARY NOTE
Judge Posner's approach to labor law focuses attention on
124. Aaron, supra note 121, at 877. An American labor court is particularly
unlikely to be less partisan than the NLRB arguably has been because the de-
centralized and highly contentious nature of American labor relations will
likely be reflected in, rather than ameliorated by, any court appointments
made by labor and management. See Bok, supra note 121, at 1453-54.
125. For criticisms of the "expertise" of such administrative-law judges by
Judge Posner, however, see NLRB v. Acme Die Casting Corp., 728 F.2d 959,
962 (7th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Coca-Cola Co. Foods Div., 670 F.2d 84, 86 (7th Cir.
1982).
126. Cf. E. MILLER, AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPRAISAL OF THE NLRB 46-65
(1977) (observing that labor lawyers generally do not apply to become adminis-
trative-law judges).
127. See Nolan & Lehr, Improving NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Proce-
dures, 57 TEx. L. REV. 47, 70 (1979).
128. See E. MILLER, supra note 126, at 50-56; see also Miller, The Tangled
Path to an Administrative Judgeship, 25 LAB. L.J. 3 (1974).
129. Nolan & Lehr, supra note 127, at 69.
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several problems in administering the NLRA and highlights
useful congressional reforms. For example, Judge Posner's rec-
ommendations that Congress clarify specific areas of statutory
or interpretative vagueness and that Congress require the
Board to use rule making more frequently' merit support.
Acknowledging the need for reform, however, entails accept-
ance neither of Judge Posner's premise of the NLRB's antiem-
ployer bias nor of his remedies of overriding or dismantling the
Board.
Judge Posner's view of the NLRB as inappropriately pro-
union is short-sighted. NLRB biases, at least since the passage
of the Taft-Hartley amendments, have been fluid, with deci-
sions of Democrat-appointed Boards tending to be more pro-
union than those of Republican-appointed Boards.131 Thus,
when the conservative Eisenhower Board reversed many of the
policies of the Roosevelt-Truman era,132 CIO President Walter
Reuther and others stridently accused it of distorting the
130. See supra notes 94-117 and accompanying text.
13L For an excellent empirical study documenting this proposition, see
Cooke & Gautschi, Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 539 (1982). See generally Defense of NLRB's Per-
formance, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 103 (June 11, 1984) (speech by former
NLRB Chairperson Edward B. Miller, responding to criticism of the Reagan
Board's promanagement bias) [hereinafter cited as Defense].
It is not surprising that Democratic Boards render decisions that are more
prounion than those of Republican boards. Democratic presidents have tended
to appoint individuals with prounion sympathies to the Board. Several Demo-
cratic appointees have previously served as aides to prounion members of Con-
gress. For example, Frank McCulloch, the chairperson of the Kennedy-
Johnson Board, was a former aide to prounion Senator Paul H. Douglas of illi-
nois. See F. McCULLocH & T. BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 70 (1974). Because the Democratic Party has recently become even
more closely aligned with organized labor, the trend of Democratic Presidents
appointing individuals to the NLRB with generally prounion leanings can cer-
tainly be expected to continue. Republican Presidents have tended to name
management labor lawyers, some of whom return to representation of man-
agement after their Board terms expire, including Guy Farmer (former
chairperson), Peter Walther, Betty Murphy (former chairperson), and Edward
B. Miller (former chairperson). See 11 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIREcToRY
473 (1985) (Murphy); id. at 685B (Farmer); id. at 2668B (Miller); V i. at
1312B. For criticisms of Democratic Boards for being too "prounion," see F.
McCuLunc & T. BORNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 72-73; K. McGUINESS, supra
note 122. For criticisms of Republican Boards for being too "promanagement,"
see Anti-Union Bias, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 53 (May 21, 1984); Dotson
Board, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 90 (June 4, 1984) (statement of AFL-CIO
Secretary-Treasurer Thomas Donahue); NLRB Rulings That Are Inflaming
Labor Relations, Bus. WIY., June 11, 1984 at 122, 127, 130 [hereinafter cited as
NLRB Rulings].
132. See S. McCuLLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 6L
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NLRA in favor of employers. 133 The Kennedy-Johnson Board
quickly reversed many of the Eisenhower Board's policies, and
a variety of prominent management observers then sharply
criticized the Board for a blatantly prounion approach. 3 4 The
Nixon-Ford and Carter Boards, of course, brought similar pol-
icy reversals and similar criticism.1 35
Today, many observers believe that the NLRB, which has
had a Reagan-appointed majority since late 1983, is biased to-
ward employers.136 The Reagan NLRB has reversed the Carter
Board on many important issues13 7 and thereby raised the ire
of the AFL-CIO and its political allies. The AFL-CIO Execu-
tive Council has accused the Reagan Board of "malevolence"
toward unions,138 and the federation's president, Lane Kirk-
land, recently stated that the NLRB "now is a deterrent, a
weapon of the most retrograde, antiunion employers and forces
in this country."' 39 Donald L. Dotson, a former management
attorney and the Reagan-appointed Board chairperson, coun-
tered by asserting that the Board is not on an ideological anti-
union campaign and that "[t]he pendulum had swung too far to
the left; now it is moving back toward the middle, where it
should remain.' 140 Thus, despite the views of Judge Posner
133. See Dunau, supra note 18, at 206-07.
134. Perhaps the most trenchant of such criticism is set forth in K. McGuI.
NESS, supra note 122.
135. See generally NLRB Rulings, supra note 131, at 122, 127.
136. See AFL-CIO Views on NLRB Actions, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 46
(May 21, 1984) [hereinafter cited as AFL-CIO Views]; Defense, supra note 131;
NLRB Rulings, supra note 131, at 122.
137. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
138. See AFL-CIO Views, supra note 136, at 46.
139. See NLRB Rulings, supra note 131, at 122.
140. 1& A perhaps more telling response to recent AFL-CIO criticism,
however, has come from former NLRB Chairperson Edward B. Miller, who
finds it "incredible" that the labor federation and its allies are "crying foul
when the current Board is changing its views on a handful of issues in the
same manner that every Board has always changed whenever new members
are appointed." See Defense, supra note 131, at 104. There are, of course, as
Professor Derek Bok has noted, obvious political benefits in terms of rational-
izing adverse decisions and laying the groundwork for possible legislative ac-
tion in making such accusations. See Bok, supra note 121, at 1451.
In any event, such swings of the pendulum can have some ironic twists.
For example, one of the major current complaints against the Reagan Board
by the AFL-CIO and Democratic legislators has regarded the Board's attempt
to assume greater control over the agency's quasi-independent general coun-
sel's office. A similar complaint emerged in 1950 when President Truman, un-
happy with his appointment to the general-counsel spot, asked Congress to
diminish the general counsel's role and transfer much of the chief lawyer's au-
thority t6 the Board itself. The Republican-dominated Congress refused. See
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and others, the NLRB has not demonstrated an unbroken path
of antiemployer sentiment. Although the NLRB has at times
been biased, that bias has shifted as Board membership has
changed.
Furthermore, it is not evident that Board bias is undesir-
able. Board partisanship, particularly a fluctuating partisan-
ship, can be a stabilizing influence by reflecting the prevailing
national political climate, at least as expressed in presidential
elections 41 As Professor Clyde Summers noted:
Ought not government, in the making of policies, reflect majority
will? Should not administrative agencies, within the area of discre-
tion granted them, choose the policy which most accurately expresses
the desires of the majority? To do so is to make democracy more re-
sponsive, an especially significant contribution when government
tends to become remote.142
The answer for the critics of any Board is not to be found in
judicial activism but in political activity designed to change the
politicians and their policies. 143
CONCLUSION
Judge Richard A. Posner's criticisms of the National Labor
Relations Board have emphasized that the Board is prounion
and that it has not properly executed its role as a neutral ad-
ministrator and enforcer of the NLRA. In an effort to rectify
the Board's alleged bias, Judge Posner has ignored the Board's
administrative expertise and readily overturned several Board
decisions. Some of Judge Posner's comments have exposed
problems with regard to the NLRA and its administration and
have suggested possible solutions. It is Congress, however, and
not the federal judiciary, that has the primary responsibility for
F. McCuLLocH & T. BoRNsTEIN, supra note 131, at 58-60; Consolidation of
NLRB Enforcement Power Under New Solicitor, 113 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 41
(May 16, 1983); ARB Solicitor In Enforcement Role, 113 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 201 (July 11, 1983).
141. Cf Shapiro, Why Do Voters Vote? (Book Review), 86 YALE UJ. 1532,
1545 (1977) ('That shifts in the substance of Board policy often follow shifts in
the Board's political complexion is well known. Indeed such shifts may be de-
sirable-so long as the policies remain within statutory grounds-if the admin-
istration of federal labor law is to reflect in some degree the prevailing
political climate.").
142. Summers, supra note 114, at 100. But see Cooke & Gautachi, supra
note 131, at 548-49 (presenting an opposing view).
143. The AFL-CIO was very active in this regard and officially endorsed a
candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for the first time in 1983. See
A.F.L-CLO. Chiefs Support Mondale for '84 Nomination, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2.
1983, at 1, col. 6.
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formulating our nation's labor laws. Consequently, it is up to
the Congress to take whatever action is necessary. Any con-
gressional consideration of reform, however, must proceed with
caution. Outcries about NLRB bias in any given time period
tend to overshadow the bias of other times and the reality that
bias is in part a positive reflection of the political process in
operation.
